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Care, Kidneys and Clones: the distance of space, time and imagination 
 
Sarah Atkinson  
Department of Geography and the Centre for Medical Humanities, Durham University 
 
‘We lived, as usual by ignoring. Ignoring isn't the same as ignorance, you have to work at it.’ 
(Margaret Atwood in The Handmaid’s Tale)1   
 
Care as a concept is central to any engagement with health, ill-health and the practices that 
aim to prevent, mitigate or cure, and the term itself is mobilised in a variety of different ways 
and at a variety of different scales. The vibrancy of the medical humanities as a relatively 
new field of enquiry has principally derived from the elaboration of experiential accounts of 
differential and dynamic conditions of health. Given this particular emphasis, attention to 
care and caring practices has predominantly concerned the nuanced and complex relations of 
care at an inter-personal and proximate scale. However, in contemporary landscapes of health 
care, given the resources for caring for ourselves or for those whom we cherish in our 
immediate environment are often scarce and demand greatly outstrips the supply available 
within a national system, increasingly health care resources are sourced globally: from the 
migrant care worker2 through to the transplant tourist.3 A major challenge, then, for an 
expanded and more critically directed field of medical humanities is to extend the 
geographical reach to renegotiate encounters with the central concepts of our field at different 
spatial and temporal scales. Several chapters in this Companion take up the challenge to 
develop medical humanities as globally situated and with critical attention to the uneven 
flows and distributions of resources, including those of power and care.4 
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This chapter explores the dilemmas, paradoxes and challenges in how we care at a global 
scale with reference to the unequal availability and accessibility of transplant technology. In 
the medical humanities, we often draw our insights from imaginative literature, a source 
which can be read in many different ways.  As a social scientist examining the practices and 
tensions in care at different scales, my reading of imaginative fiction attends specifically to 
the issues, rhetoric and modes of argumentation mobilised or disclosed within different 
imagined scenarios. And unlike much of the emergent work on global medical humanities, 
my focus is not on the historical and post-colonial roots of current global inequity and 
treatment of differentiated bodies as the ways in which access to new technologies follows 
established inequalities is already well documented.5 Instead, I attend to existing and possible 
future rhetorics of care in relation to the relatively recent technology of organ transplant.  In 
particular, I draw out the tensions in deciding for whom we care, and for whom we do not 
care and argue that the privileging of some bodies over others requires explicit rhetorical, 
discursive and enacted strategies for both caring and not caring. 
 
The case of the transplant tourist 
Autobiographical narratives offer nuanced accounts of the experiences of altered health and 
of the author’s journey in seeking health care provision. Such accounts furnish mainstream 
medical humanities with a ‘database’ of experiential knowledge from which to redress the 
invisibility of those actually living with conditions of ill-health prevalent in traditional 
medical and educational accounts. However, first-hand accounts of the experiences of 
sourcing medical care through a global market are few. Larry’s Kidney6 is a rare 
autobiography of transplant tourism recounted by Daniel, who has been asked by his cousin 
Larry to accompany him in seeking a kidney illegally in China.  The focus in this account 
primarily on the experiential aspects of their journey reveals how such accounts may occlude 
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ethical aspects. Daniel nods towards the ethical concerns of Larry’s quest only twice in the 
account, making clear he has decided to shelve his reservations and respond to his cousin’s 
request. It falls to an expatriate in China to voice objections, ‘“I’m just against checkbook 
medical tourism,” he declaims flatly. “There are two million people waiting for organs in 
China. It’s repugnant for cowboys to come in and try to jump ahead of them.”’.7 In response, 
Daniel effectively asserts that any care related to unknown others is trumped by care related 
to those we know intimately, ‘“All I’m saying is that under ordinary circumstances I might be 
tempted to be dogmatic too,” I tell the man. “But when it’s your own relative’s life on the 
line, you tend to see a few more shades of grey.”’ and, ‘Well, I’m suspending all ethical 
considerations because he’s my cousin.’8 Despite Daniel’s declaration that he’s going to 
effectively shelve worrying about the wider ethical concerns in favour of the intimate care for 
his cousin, he also works at ignoring the issue through a justification grounded in different 
cultural ethics, ‘But here people don’t have the same general attitude against it that there is in 
the West. It’s not frowned upon ethically the way it is in much of your United States.’9    
 
Scales of Care  
These few quotations from Larry’s Kidney indicate a tension between different scales and 
practices of care, but this is a tension explicitly ignored in preference for attention to practical 
and emotional experiences.10 The emerging global pathways for sourcing caring resources, 
stretching beyond the reach of national regulatory agencies or locally shared values and 
sanctions, present new challenges for how we conceptualise care and for whom we care.   
 
Different understandings and definitions of care draw on at least two etymological roots 
which together inflect the concept with an inherent tension. On the one hand, the Latin root 
‘cura’ relates the immediate and intimate emotional bonds of love or friendship as a care 
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directed to others that is characterised by both devotion and worry for their wellbeing. On the 
other hand, the Latin ‘cogitare’ is commonly translated in terms of a distanced care of others 
manifest through contemplation, attention or interest but which still involves a commitment 
to the object’s wellbeing.11 Care is presented as a broad attitude and way of being in the 
world in which our focus is directed away from the self and towards relationalities with 
others; such relationalities are characterised on the one hand by affection and commitment 
and on the other by concern and responsibility.12 These two etymological origins of care also 
inform contemporary feminist theorisations which commonly make a distinction between 
‘caring-for’ known and proximate others and ‘caring-about’ issues and others beyond our 
immediate everyday lives.13 This distinction extends beyond people to embrace other life 
forms, places and issues: ‘caring-for’ our pets, our gardens and our local, immediate political 
issues compared with ‘caring-about’ biodiversity, rain forests or poverty and global justice.  
 
At the heart of this distinction is an engagement of different emotional intensities. We are 
emotionally invested in our immediate spaces of material place, persons and issues; ‘caring-
for’ people and things close to us is treated as natural and unproblematic in its cultivation 
even whilst simultaneously treated as gendered, undervalued and largely invisible.14 A failure 
to care for those whom society assumes you naturally should is met with an abhorrence and 
condemnation, the extremes of which are reserved for women in general and mothers in 
particular.15 By contrast, the cultivation of ‘caring-about’ more distant others may be 
acknowledged as desirable, a wise collective investment in social coherence as well as 
personal insurance, but this requires the collective ratification of formalised structures to 
enable us to express such caring within certain limits. The collective agreement of how we 
care about others takes different form in different societies; in the United Kingdom, the NHS 
reflects a collective agreement to provide health care to all at the point of delivery and 
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through a progressive form of taxation; elsewhere, health systems funded through private 
insurance assert an individualised responsibility for health care but a collective care for 
regulating provision. ‘Caring-about’ is treated as a matter for an impartial, unemotional 
attention to social justice and egalitarian rights.16 Although willingness for collective care 
about one another may evoke emotional intensity, this is an intensity of commitment invested 
into an idea, of justice, of solidarity or of morality, rather than an intensity of affective 
attachment to the specific other. Moreover, caring about unknown others, places or issues is 
not understood or treated as natural and self-evident; on the contrary, the implicit default 
position is that it is natural not to care about others and that to do so requires a rationale and 
some intentional effort.  
 
These diverse modalities of caring collectively about others are shaped by complex 
interactions of vested interests and cultural currencies in terms of how we conceive of 
ourselves, our bodies, health and the possibilities for health care. These complex interactions 
have, to date, largely been confronted through formal structures within the bounds of the 
nation-state. Where caring about an issue or distant other can be assigned a monetary value, 
modalities for expressing such care are relatively easily mobilised. Thus, we collectively 
agree on how to fund public institutions of care; we collectively agree to government  
spending on international development. But where ‘caring-about’ depends on less well 
established or easily engaged routes for expression as when it is evoked through a rhetoric of 
advocacy, social justice or morality, the pathways for translating emotional care into a 
responsive practice are not obvious. An emphasis on this translation from intention to action 
challenges the primacy of ‘caring-about’ as an attitude; whilst care may indeed be usefully 
comprehended as first and foremost an attitude to our ways of being in the world and our 
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relationalities to others, if such an attitude of care is not also translated into a practice of care 
it signifies little more than token sentimentality.  
 
There is, therefore, a potential inherent tension in how these differentiated trajectories of 
personal and abstract care may relate to one another. The relation may be complementary: a 
commitment, attitude and policy of caring about unknown others may be necessary to enable 
both the attitudes and opportunities to enact ‘caring-for’; a capacity of caring for immediate 
others may constitute an affective attitude of compassion that extends into the expression of 
‘caring-about’.17 However, if the resources and practices needed to fulfil ‘caring-for’ are in 
competition or conflict with those needed to fulfil ‘caring-about’, the tension of caring will be 
resolved through accommodations derived from both hidden, unspoken assumptions and the 
exercise of specific arguments. The emerging critical medical humanities are particularly well 
situated to disclose and interrogate the discourses and rhetoric that inform the 
accommodations made in specific case examples.  The feminist ethic of care offers an 
important response to the tension between ‘caring-for’ and ‘caring-about’.18 The approach 
emphasises the certain interdependence of all humans over the life-course; at different points 
in our lives we are all likely both to receive care and provide care. As such, the desirable 
citizen is not autonomous and independent and that care, far from being a marginal activity, 
is in fact the central activity in human social life, ‘care ethics raises caring, nurturing, and the 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships to the status of foundational moral importance’.19 
Understood this way, it follows that policy should position caring relations as its primary 
goal, ‘In short, care is society’s work in the sense that care is absolutely central to our 
individual and collective survival’.20  
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These various engagements with care all implicitly suggest that a lack of ‘caring-about’ is 
something of a default and passive position; we are without care, careless, inattentive or 
ignorant about the relations shaping the circumstances of others. As such, our lack of care, 
our care-lessness is an attitude or way of being in the world but one that does not entail any 
action, practice or doing, an attitude constituting a state of ‘uncare’.21 The attention is given 
to the possible strategies we have to put in place to enable and facilitate an active state of 
‘caring-about’: a political commitment to public provision,  a monetarised on-line charitable 
consumer experience that benefits distant others or an overall ethic that makes care central to 
society’s norms. In contrast, I will argue in line with the chapter’s opening quotation from 
Margaret Atwood that we are not merely ignorant but actively ignoring and, as such, we 
engage in strategies through which we are enabled and enable ourselves to sustain the passive 
ignorance of ‘uncare’ and to practice an actively ignoring ‘not-care’. These strategies for 
‘uncare’ and ‘not-care’ draw on the distances of space, time and imagination. 
 
Imagining strategies of care and practice 
Rapid advances in biomedical technologies for reproduction, reconstruction and regeneration 
include the transplantation of organs from one body to another. Alongside such ‘miracles’ of 
modern medical practice, contemporary processes of globalisation have eased travel and trade 
to generate new spaces, markets, rhetoric and imaginaries for medical care at an international 
level. These new possibilities to reinvent and recycle ourselves are accompanied by new 
ethical challenges related to resource flows, inequalities of access and the nature of care at a 
global scale. Imaginative fiction offers medical humanities at least two entry points in 
developing a global and critical engagement with the practices of care. First, literature and 
film enable their audiences to encounter the issues, to confront their own reactions in relation 
to care and to reflect on the implications of the rhetoric for different practices of care. As 
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such, engagement with the creative imaginings of future or alternative dystopic societies and 
of relatively unfamiliar aspects of contemporary societies can illuminate the ways we do and 
might practice care, uncare and not-caring. Moreover, and secondly, as the conduit for our 
reflections on different practices, scales and tensions of care, these creative imaginings have 
their own agency as strategies themselves for care, uncare and not-caring. To effect a critical 
medical humanities, we need not only to examine the differentiated modes of argumentation 
for different practices of care that are conceived within creative worlds, but to engage 
critically how imaginary practices themselves inform our practices at local and global scales. 
 
Imagining future dystopias 
Imagined future worlds free us to play with the potential limits of the logics of our own 
caring practices. Creative imaginings of future or alternative dystopic societies have 
positioned the population’s wellbeing as maintained through the medical exploitation of a 
parallel sub-class.  
 
In such imaginings, the moral position is always unequivocal: the uncaring practices are 
condemned and humanity is restored to exploited bodies. The insights for our own 
contemporary practices of care may be drawn from the various discourses that are used by the 
dominant population to justify treating and categorising their supplier population as non-
human.  In the New Earth of the year 5 billion and 23, imagined by the creators of the BBC’s 
Dr Who22, the hospital run by the Sisters of Plenitude, cat-kind nuns, can cure all human 
ailments. However, it transpires that the nuns’ healing expertise has been gained through 
macabre means. The sisters have accelerated their rate of knowledge acquisition by 
experimenting on thousands of human clones which they secretly grow in vaults and infect 
with diseases. The sisters suppress the clones’ potential humanity through constant sedation 
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and kill any that display resistance to the drugs and signs of awareness and thought. The 
actions of the sisters are illegal in the society of New Earth but it seems no-one is looking too 
closely at the source of the evident gains. Similarly, in Michael Bay’s film, The Island23, the 
use that is being made of technology to exploit a sub- or non-human class is not condoned; 
customers think they have purchased the growth of customised, matching organs. In this case, 
it is the scientist-businessman who has found it more convenient and successful - for which 
we understand profitable - to produce whole body clones. But again, we intuit a society 
happy not to ask too many questions about the procedures making good their investments. 
Indeed, when the non-clone customer confronts the reality of his cloned body double, acting 
in a caring and ethical manner proves too difficult in the face of his potential mortality.  
 
The society of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go24 has also invested in clone 
technology as a response to the growing medical demand for organ transplants in its 
population. However, by contrast to New Earth and The Island, in Ishiguro’s world cloning 
for the purpose of increased and customised organ supply is expressly condoned by the 
society, that is, the exploitation of the clones is openly sanctioned and, as such, requires 
different and collective strategies to justify their subjugation to organ harvesting. Whilst the 
clones are well looked after, they must nevertheless still be categorised as sub-human, even 
by those most intimately involved with their childhoods. A woman who collects their art 
work displays her abhorrence; their head-teacher admits that she always had to steel herself to 
face them.  Ishiguro makes more explicit the ways that discourse differentiates bodies and 
underpins the power relations that enable the sustainable exploitation of some bodies by 
others. However, unlike the discourses of racism and slavery, discrimination against the 
corporeal other is no longer grounded in assumed associations and disassociations of genetics 
and geographical origins; differentiation is not based on outward signs of potential group 
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otherness such as colour, dress or religion but by an inward or invisible otherness defined by 
their personal provenance. Where two bodies intentionally share the same genetic make-up, 
superiority and dominance are granted on the grounds of which body is authentically human 
(see a related discussion in Viney’s chapter in this volume on twins in science). In turn, 
human authenticity becomes dependent on being begotten of two parents and on being the 
original first version; identical ‘copies’ derived through technology do not count as 
authentically human and, as such, have no claim to human rights. 
  
These alternative societies warn of moral perils from medical technology, but their distance 
in time or imagination and the clear moral condemnation with which they are treated by their 
authors implies their scenarios are improbable. Collectively, as reader or viewer, we endorse 
the condemnation inherent in these explorations and we acknowledge the perils of new 
biotechnologies through enforcing strict regulation and ensuring regular public reflection and 
debate on that regulation. However, treating these scenarios as improbable cautionary tales 
may overstate both our condemnation and the power of regulation. Even in the setting in 
which the clones are most abased, the morality is tinged with a troubling ambiguity. The 
Sisters of Plenitude in Dr. Who do not act from self-interest; they act from a professional 
commitment, compassion even, to care both about and for their human patients and as such 
justify their actions by arguing that more humane methods of research would have been too 
slow.  This form of argumentation, whilst supporting a horrendous practice, does nonetheless 
chime with contemporary exposures of health professionals acting illegally, but for the 
collective good, including through body mining.25 In Never Let Me Go, Ishiguro cleverly 
complicates the distances of space and time by imagining a society that, apart from cloning, 
resonates in all respects with a British recent past. Indeed, he plays down the technology to 
11 
 
discomfort us in relation to caring, or to what I have called uncaring, about others across a 
range of contemporary issues.26 
 
Ishiguro’s novel is instructive in a further sense. The cloned young people that the novel 
follows through the account of Kathy largely accept their destiny as donors. There are 
perhaps only two moments in the book when the characters dream of by-passing their fate 
and at no time do they attempt to resist the path laid out for them. Thus, even those exploited 
by society’s practices accept them, resonant with a Nietzschean concept of the slave morality. 
This theme is echoed in Ninni Holmqvist’s The Unit27 which imagines a most plausible future 
society, a near-future Sweden that has adapted its tradition of a strong collective commitment 
to the welfare state to encompass a collective response to the demand for scarce organs. At 
fifty, those persons categorised as non-essential must move to the closed ‘Unit’ of the title 
from where they will be involved in drug tests and make donations up to their death. The Unit 
is luxurious, the inhabitants well looked after in a similar way to Kathy and her friends in 
Never Let Me Go; the critical aspect here is who counts as essential and who does not. The 
Unit is thus populated by those without children, without established partners or not in a 
valued occupation; many of the population are artists. But child-care duties and natural 
parenthood is not quite enough, it transpires; when the main character falls in love and 
becomes pregnant, she cannot be reclassified and not because of bureaucracy. As an artist, as 
a late parent, she is already fatally designated as unsuitable to care for her child who will be 
adopted by a ‘normalised’ family. She escapes with help from sympathetic workers at the 
facility, but chooses to return, accepting her society’s values and future pathways for both her 
and her child. In both Ishiguro and Holmqvist’s novels, socialisation into a given set of 
values enables the exploitation of some by others in part because the exploited enact their 
own compliance with the system of collective care.  
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Atwood28, reflecting on Ishiguro, comments that the insight here may be how much we all 
have the capacity to accept the status quo and our embedding norms, an insight easily 
extended to practices of uncaring and not caring. Moreover, the assigned role for the 
designated donor ironically is a role of caring both about and directly for unknown others and 
the donors are, up to a point, themselves formally cared both about and for through the 
collectively supported institutions they inhabit. But both Holmqvist and Ishiguro indicate the 
fragility of the care offered to these donor bodies in their imagined societies, as explicitly 
stressed to Kathy in Never Let Me Go:   
‘“When I watched you dancing that day, I saw something else. I saw a new world coming 
rapidly. More scientific, efficient, yes. More cures for the old sicknesses. Very good. But a 
harsh, cruel world. And I saw a little girl, her eyes tightly closed, holding to her breast the old 
kind world, one that she knew in her heart could not remain, and she was holding it and 
pleading, never to let her go.”29  
Once bodies are cast as less valued, as amenable to exploitation to save more valued others, 
then they are already effectively categorised as lesser humans and the discourse supporting a 
limited caring about and for those bodies can be easily transformed into the very different 
justifications underpinning an attitude and practice of uncaring and not caring.  
 
Imagining contemporary beneficence 
By contrast to the exploitative practice of organ transplants in these future or alternative 
imaginary worlds, fictions involving medical technology in real-world contemporary Western 
societies mostly explore personal beatific and emotional dimensions to donation. The sudden 
and unexpected loss of a child offers a narrative theme through which to explore journeys in 
managing grief by caring about others and to promote donation by relatives of those 
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deceased. Two novels exemplify this particular narrative30: Lauraine Snelling’s One Perfect 
Day and Jill Wolfson’s Cold Hands, Warm Heart. Both follow the emotional journeys of 
several characters closely connected to the child who has died and to the ill child who 
benefits from the donation. The focus on children underscores both the loss and the benefit by 
maximising the time lost and reclaimed and renders both loss and benefit wholly 
unambiguous. And the unambiguous benefit of donation to save the life of an ill child affords 
the relatives of the deceased a form of redemption from their suffering.  In a similar vein, 
Manuela, the central character in Pedro Almodóvar’s film All About My Mother31, finds 
meaning after the death of her son through a story that ‘depends, as so many things do, on the 
kindness of strangers.’32 Almodóvar, however, goes further by unrolling the notion of care as 
embracing difference, inclusion and acceptance.  As well as the stranger who now carries 
Esteban’s heart, Manuela encounters various others who transgress bodily norms, who 
‘improvise their way through their own lives’ but who are always present for each other. 
Their enactment of care not only helps with practical matters but accepts and nourishes one 
another.33  
 
These imaginings parallel and mirror the contemporary discourses of organ donation in 
affluent societies which predominantly celebrate an altruistic caring about unknown others 
through the metaphor of the gift.34  Where live donation is possible, as for kidneys, the heroic 
and life-saving rhetoric is even stronger, yet strangely buoyed up further with commercial 
post-donation products such as t-shirts or jewellery, which serve both to advertise live 
donation and to bring the donor greater public acclaim. This shift in emphasis, from the 
private satisfaction of caring to public acclaim, intimates at subtle shifts in the dominant 
discourse of voluntary caring, shifts related to organ procurement that revolve around 
ownership and commoditisation of bodies. The most common organ procurement route is 
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through voluntary opt-in donation after death: those willing to donate sign up to a registry, 
carry a card or have their wishes recorded on their driving licence. However, as demand 
continues to out-pace supply, alternative strategies to increase donation are under debate. 
Several countries have already introduced the controversial opt-out system for posthumous 
donation, including Spain and Finland, in which donation is assumed unless the deceased has 
made express wishes to the contrary before death.35 The issues embedding debates in favour 
and against an opt-out system for organ procurement in part turn on an associated debate on 
who owns the body after death. In an opt-out system, the body is effectively owned by the 
state to be used to care for others unless otherwise indicated by the deceased and, as such, the 
wishes of surviving relatives need no longer be sought and in theory would have no purchase 
over the uses made of cadaveric materials. The necessity of maintaining the viability of a 
healthy organ from posthumous organ donation has been accompanied by a redefinition of 
what constitutes death which in turn is associated with counter discourses and debates related 
to the possibilities of continued awareness and the practice of ventilation before donation.36 
Such expressions of disquiet may engage philosophical and ethical considerations of what 
constitutes life and death, but none of these discourses suggests any move towards justifying 
the exploitation evident in New Earth or The Island.  Nonetheless, the inherent and growing 
gap between demand and supply informs the imaginary society to care about its non-cloned 
population through a justified not caring about its cloned bodies; this gap is a feature of the 
contemporary world, a gap that is rapidly increasing as technologies advance. Organ 
transplants, once miraculous, are increasingly normalised such that the only barrier to 
stepping past death may be seen as organ availability.  
 
In new emerging discourses, some momentum towards the commoditisation of body parts is 
evident. The internet now furnishes registers through which to connect donors and patients, 
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an availability of contact which potentially transforms the traditional practice of donation. 
Patients can make their own personal and often highly emotive pleas for assistance. The 
conventional mode of caring about others by donating has been to donate to the medical 
system which determines who has the priority need, the recipient remaining an anonymous 
other, except in the case of family donations. Thus, the ethical principles established for both 
donating and receiving, mediated by the procedures and criteria of the medical system, are 
undermined. Those wary of this shift point out the perils of a market-based competition for a 
donated organ in which would-be recipients have to make a pitch to appeal to the caring 
sensibilities of potential donors who may privilege or discriminate against particular bodies in 
their criteria for deciding who to care about and favour with their body parts. Many of the 
positive literary and cinematic explorations of organ donation have centred on the loss or 
illness of a young person, a loss or need evoking an almost universal sympathy. For example, 
in Seattle in 2013 a father-of-two found a kidney donor by telling his story on Facebook – his 
donor came forward to care not for the ill adult man himself but on behalf of his children and 
their potential loss.37 Underpinning this emergent practice is a reassertion that body parts 
belong to their original individual ‘owner’ who holds the right to decide which other bodies 
they care about and to determine with which other bodies their parts may be incorporated.  
 
This reassertion of private ownership of body parts is implicit in Gabriele Muccino’s film 
Seven Pounds.38 Ben seeks redemption following his negligent, careless driving which caused 
the death of seven people including his fiancée. He has identified seven people, all strangers, 
to benefit from what he has to offer, following his suicide, including body parts. The film 
provides two forms of contemporary discourse through which we might effect not caring 
about others. First, the film focuses predominantly on the love story between Ben and one of 
his designated beneficiaries, and in the absence of any other likely donor, he finally sacrifices 
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himself not for a distanced ‘caring-about’ redemption but an intimate ‘caring-for’ love.  This 
motive for his suicide is clearly positioned as better than his guilt and search for redemption. 
With a modern focus on personal wellbeing, constructed as self-confidence and self-esteem39, 
guilt and redemption become pathological in contrast to the healthy pursuit of personal 
happiness. In this, ‘caring-for’ is clearly positioned as a superior motive than an abstract and 
guilt-ridden ‘caring-about’ which does not bode well for broader discussions of global 
interconnectedness, interdependence and mutual responsibilities through ‘caring-about’. 
 
But first he wants to meet them, to make sure they are worthy of his gift. However, whilst a 
ploy to bring the two characters together, the process of evaluating whether the beneficiaries 
are deserving or not invokes a long tradition of judging who is deserving of charity and social 
care and, conversely, who is not. The opportunity afforded by social media to choose what 
categories of person we care about enough to offer a gift of donation opens up issues of how 
scarce resources are to be allocated, who should decide and on what criteria. There is here an 
intimation of a quasi-market in which, although the explicit exchange of money is prohibited, 
bids, bargaining and biases start to inform the flow of organs, albeit a supply still dependent 
on gifting.  
 
Local beneficence and global markets  
From here it may be only a small step to a fully commoditised market. If we are deemed the 
owners of our original body parts, it should follow that we hold the right to sell them. The 
arguments against the commercialisation of body parts include the acknowledgement that 
markets are care-less of the large inequalities both within countries and between countries in 
access to transplant technology. The success of immunosuppressant drugs in transplant 
technology renders the acceptance of an organ possible from a far wider population pool than 
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was the case in the early years of donation.  Whilst organs may not be sold in Western 
societies, it is difficult to detect if a donation by an apparently consenting and caring adult 
has, in reality, been bought. Regulation across borders is even more challenging. Moreover, 
new markets for transplant tourism amplify the general concerns of medical tourism, for not 
only are scarce resources of finance and expertise drawn into the private sector and away 
from public care for the local population, but the flow of the scarce resource of a donated 
organ from donor to recipient tracks and reproduces existing inequalities in flowing from 
underprivileged to privileged: from south to north; from poor bodies to rich bodies; from 
women to men; from black bodies to white bodies.5  
 
Regulating organ transplantation shares challenges and responses with the governance of 
other global health concerns: global agreement has been drawn up through the 2008 
Declaration of Istanbul informing the laws subsequently introduced in those countries 
endorsing the declaration.40 But making guidelines effective also needs the support of 
resources and attitudes. The gap between demand and supply and inequalities in ability to pay 
has generated a well-documented illegal trade in the unregulated movement of organs. Direct 
coercion, as in the extraction of organs from executed prisoners without prior or family 
consent, has been condemned as an abuse of human rights, a practice that in China at least 
has been modified in response to international protest. Nonetheless, the treatment of 
prisoners’ bodies as belonging to the state hints at how short the distance may be towards a 
discourse of practice resonant with those found in New Earth, The Island or Never Let Me Go 
which enables the recategorisation of criminals on death row as no longer full citizens 
entitled to human rights or practices of care (Lisa Guenther, in this Companion, also 
discusses the exercise of power and care over bodies on death row in the United States). 
Indirect coercion involves organ and kidney ‘brokers’ who encourage the sale of kidneys by 
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those in poverty and debt. Whereas the altruistic Facebook donor donated to a known other 
from ‘care-about’ that other’s family, the indebted seller donates to an unknown other for 
money through which to ‘care-for’ his or her own family. The commoditisation of body parts 
has commonly been viewed as exploitative and abhorrent and the practice is illegal in many 
countries, although there are alternative viewpoints which point out that the informal organ 
trade can take many different forms, each bringing different sets of ethical dilemmas.41 
Furthermore, a new advocacy for a pro-market stance is now emerging. The arguments take 
at least two directions. First, if we are to ‘care-about’ meeting the current and future needs for 
organ transplant, then increasing organ supply through market processes justifies a pro-
market policy.42 The Economist calculated that current demand for organs in the United 
States could be met if just 0.06% of its population aged 19-65 years were to donate.43 
Secondly, methodological innovations that ‘care-about’ the voice of the poor themselves 
enable expression of a narrative of life-changing benefit for those selling their kidneys, ‘Their 
reaction was: "Who are you to judge? Walk a mile in my shoes. You don't know what it's like 
to live in poverty." These men weren't bothered by their choice. Some of them changed their 
lives, others squandered the money. All of them say, "I made money, but I also saved a 
life."’44  
 
This use of people’s own voices to transform what has been viewed as exploitation into a 
form of liberation presents methodological, ethical and normative issues for a field like 
medical humanities that privileges experiential accounts. If a first-hand experiential account 
is taken uncritically at face-value, then various practices that in many ways seem far from 
caring become justified and normalised. On the other hand, if people’s own accounts are 
dismissed as representing a false consciousness or an adaptive preference, then we return to 
privileging only the accounts of the few (see discussions elsewhere in medical humanities by 
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Parry45 or Atkinson46).  People’s own narratives are not, of course, always supportive of the 
status quo or complicit in their own exploitation. French folklorist Veronique Campion-
Vincent in 1997 first identified a genre of local story-telling that recounted tales of organ 
theft which she documented across different parts of the world. These narratives, she argued, 
‘express a unified set of beliefs in organized criminal groups of organ traffickers who use 
kidnapping and murder, often of children and infants, to procure human organs for a vast 
network of medical professionals engaged in covert transplants that yield huge sums of 
money both for the criminal traffickers and the medical professionals’.47  
 
Campion-Vincent interprets these narratives as reflecting a world-wide malaise with the 
advances of medical technology, and especially organ-transplant technology which 
‘transgresses boundaries of life and death, self and other’.48 Anthropologist and activist 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues for a different interpretation by emphasising the context of 
inequalities in which the poor are explicitly frightened about their potential, and in some 
proven cases actual, powerlessness in protecting their corporeal integrity.49 This fear of 
explicit coercion informs a thriller or horror film genre in which the protagonists, again 
usually young, have to escape capture for the purposes of organ harvesting. The horror draws 
on middle-class anxieties of a criminal sub-section in society through which illegal trade 
occurs and enables its unequivocal condemnation. The additional anxiety drawn on in John 
Stockwell’s film Turistas50 concerns the moral ambiguity of global inequalities in access to 
medical care. The tourists of the title are young people from affluent nations which their 
abductors claim have been stealing organs from Brazil. The tourists will be forced to pay 
back the organ theft and their organs will be given to poor recipients in the favelas of Rio. 
Although recognising the inequalities fuelling an illegal organ trade, the film distorts caring 
about others into a gruesome and reprehensible global variant on progressive and 
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redistributive taxation which, in turn, feeds a moral xenophobia that displaces audience 
sympathies. There is then a dominant imaginary about organ trafficking and transplant 
tourism: it is to be universally condemned, dominated by criminal thugs, tends to occur 
‘elsewhere’ from the perspective of a western movie-going audience, and indeed has been 
likened to genocide or even a form of ‘neo-cannibalism’.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The creative works presented here together with emergent discourses, narratives and personal 
accounts expose complexities, paradoxes and challenges for collective caring about others 
and particularly across global scales. In a world characterised by inequality, will caring about 
all others always be an elusive goal or, as in the futuristic and alternative dystopias, do we 
already only care selectively about some whilst denying our uncaring about others through a 
set of distancing strategies? Part of how we effect our uncaring is through our depictions of 
who, how, where and when such uncaring occurs.  In the context of high-income countries in 
which donation is still predominantly shaped by the metaphor of the altruistic gift, our 
imagining of an explicitly ‘not-caring’ exploitative trade is tightly circumscribed, our care 
about such risks displaced through at least three strategies involving the distances of 
imagination, time and space. First, we appreciate and acknowledge the potential risks of 
medical technologies spawning ‘not-caring’ practices, but distance our own caring about such 
risks by locating these into imaginary futures, futures that we will avoid becoming through 
existing and further regulation and public debate. Secondly, we know of examples when the 
use of medical technologies has resulted in ‘not-caring’ practices in contemporary medical 
settings but distance our own caring about such occurrences by locating these into the sphere 
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of a criminal under-class, unreservedly condemning malpractice and supporting legislative 
regulation. New regulatory practices also enable examples of malpractice to be consigned 
safely to a misguided past (see also Will Viney’s discussion of the history of twin studies in 
this volume). Thirdly, our caring about exploitative and illegal malpractice is further 
distanced by locating such practices predominantly within the settings of lower income 
countries which are in need of support in policing and regulation.  
 
The rhetoric of the altruistic gift may remain the dominant discourse both in popular and 
policy settings, but new arguments are emergent to justify compulsory donation, 
commoditisation and market-based systems and which reformulate the relations between 
‘caring-for’ and ‘caring-about’. Encounters with imaginary future and contemporary accounts 
of organ transplantation expose several axes around which current discourses of how we 
respond, practice and manage the procurement of scarce organs are in flux: ownership of our 
body and our body parts after we die; the right to use, sell and profit from our body parts; the 
claim on receiving and benefiting from our body parts; the possibilities for recategorising 
some bodies as less valuable than other bodies.  
 
The chapter began with an example of the kind of autobiographical account that has informed 
mainstream medical humanities. The rest of the chapter complicates such accounts by 
demonstrating the need to position even intimate encounters within the broader relations of 
space, time and power.  The imaginary future worlds demonstrate the work involved in 
justifying an exploitative and ‘non-caring’ practice, work which paradoxically draws on 
rhetorics of ‘caring-for’ and ‘caring-about’. Fictional explorations of contemporary settings 
disclose the shifting interplay of ‘caring-for’ and ‘caring-about’ and the rhetorical work 
involved in privileging one over the other and some bodies over others. The chapter then 
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demonstrates the importance for those working within medical humanities to expand the 
scope of our research gaze to different scales of space and time. The chapter offers such an 
expansion through drawing out the forms of argumentation mobilised in a range of different 
fictional genres and thereby highlighting the complexities of the negotiations underpinning 
specific, individual choices narrated in first-hand accounts.  A critical medical humanities 
then, in this chapter, is enacted through a close interrogation of emergent contemporary 
discourses located within different spatial and temporal scales which discloses the hidden but 
essential work that underpins strategies of ‘not-caring’ and through which we continue to 
effect the distancing strategies of ‘uncare’.  
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